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AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT ORDER:
DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY
SIMON CHESTERMAN*
Nothing is more pernicious to an understanding of these new crimes,
or stands more in the way of the emergence of an international penal
code that could take care of them, than the common illusion that the
crime of murder and the crime of genocide are essentially the same.
The point of the latter is that an altogether different order is broken
1
and an altogether different community is violated.
Hannah Arendt

I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the establishment of ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 and the July 1998
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,2
much has been written on the history and the future of international
criminal law.3 This Article attempts the more modest task of selecting
Copyright © 2000 by Simon Chesterman.
* B.A. (Hons), University of Melbourne, 1995; LL.B. (Hons), University of Melbourne,
1997; D.Phil., University of Oxford, 2000; Associate, International Peace Academy from
October 2000. The author expresses his sincere thanks to Cécile Aptel, Stephen Donaghue, and
Katherine Gallagher for their insightful comments on earlier research for this paper. The
opinions expressed are, of course, the author’s own.
1. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 272 (1963).
2. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998).
3. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1998); REFLECTIONS ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS (Herman A.M.
von Hebel et al. eds., 1999); ROY S. LEE, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS (1999). For works
focusing on the two ad hoc Tribunals, see VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN
INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (1995); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI &
PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA (1996); KARINE LESCURE & FLORENCE TRINTIGNAL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: THE WORKING OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL OF
THE HAGUE (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE
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one category of international criminal law—crimes against
humanity—and examining the efforts to define the elements of the
various offenses encompassed within the category’s reach. This task
is particularly relevant given the ongoing work of the Preparatory
Commission for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
(“PrepCom”), which is scheduled to prepare a draft text of the
elements of crimes against humanity by June 30, 2000.4 Additionally,
this Article attempts to contribute to the jurisprudence of the
international criminal tribunals currently in existence, with particular
emphasis on the often-overlooked work of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda.
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the three
definitions of crimes against humanity elaborated in the statutes of
the two ad hoc Tribunals and the Rome Statute. Part III then
considers the general requirements that elevate an act to a crime
against humanity. Part IV examines the elements of specific offenses,
focusing on the three acts that have received particular judicial
consideration: murder, extermination, and rape.
The Article
concludes by observing that the divergent approaches adopted in the
three fora under consideration here—the two ad hoc Tribunals and
the conferences on the permanent Court—expose distinct and
sometimes inconsistent underlying policy goals.
II. THREE DEFINITIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
The Rome Statute5 and the statutes of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)6 and Rwanda (ICTR)7

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA (1997); JOHN R.W.D. JONES, THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
AND RWANDA (1998). For recent works on crimes against humanity in particular, see M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2d. ed.
1999); Phyllis Hwang, Defining Crimes Against Humanity In The Rome Statute Of The
International Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998); Darryl Robinson, Defining
“Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (1999); Beth Van
Schaack, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 787 (1999). For additional sources, see citations in Simon Chesterman, Never
Again . . . and Again: Law, Order and the Gender of War Crimes in Bosnia and Beyond, 22
YALE J. INT’L L. 299 (1997).
4. See Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Resolution F, ¶¶ 5-6, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/10 (1998).
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 2, art. 7 [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
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provide different definitions as to what constitutes a crime against
humanity. All three instruments state that certain acts (referred to as
“crimes” in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR) committed under
defined circumstances constitute crimes against humanity. In the
statutes of the ICTY and ICTR, the relevant acts are: murder;
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture;
rape; persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds; and
other inhumane acts.8 In addition to these acts, the Rome Statute
includes the crime of apartheid and the enforced disappearance of
persons. The Rome Statute also elaborates the types of acts requisite
for crimes against humanity.9 For example, while the relevant articles
of the ad hoc Tribunals use the unadorned term “rape,”10 the Rome
Statute refers to “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity.”11
A crime against humanity requires that the acts outlined above
take place under defined circumstances. The ICTY Statute mandates
that the act be “committed in armed conflict, whether international or
internal in character, and directed against any civilian population.”12
By contrast, the ICTR Statute defines a crime against humanity as an
act “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or
religious grounds.”13 This definition is closer to the position of the
Rome Statute, which requires that a crime against humanity be
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed
against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”14 The
Rome Statute further provides that an “‘[a]ttack directed against any
civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple
6. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), amended
by U.N.S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., 3878th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166 (1998)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
7. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR
Statute].
8. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3.
9. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, arts. 7(1)-(3).
10. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5(g); ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3(g).
11. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1)(g). “Forced pregnancy” is further defined in art.
7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute, supra note 2.
12. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5.
13. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3.
14. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(1).

CHESTERMAN.DOC

310

06/22/00 8:19 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 10:307

commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack.”15
This Part will examine three significant differences in the
definitions of crimes against humanity: (a) the requirement of an
armed conflict in the ICTY Statute; (b) the requirement of
discriminatory grounds in the ICTR Statute; and (c) the significance
of the words “widespread or systematic” in the ICTR and Rome
Statutes.
A. Requirement of an Armed Conflict in the ICTY Statute
One of the most significant differences between the statutes of
the ICTY and the ICTR is that the former requires proof of the
existence of an armed conflict (either international or internal) while
the latter does not.16 The requirement of an armed conflict recalls
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter,17 which limited the
Nuremberg Tribunal’s jurisdiction to crimes against humanity
committed before or during the World War II. The Tribunal held
that acts before 1939 were excluded due to the requirement that
crimes against humanity be committed “in execution of or in
connection with” war crimes or crimes against peace.18 It is now well
settled that customary international law does not require the
existence of an armed conflict for an act to be a crime against
humanity,19 a position reflected in the ICTR Statute and the Rome
Statute. Thus, the ICTY Statute’s armed conflict prerequisite is
above and beyond the requirements of customary international law.
The ICTY Statute’s further requirement that crimes against
humanity also be “directed against any civilian population” led to
some uncertainty as to whether it was necessary to establish a nexus
between the act and the armed conflict, or between the act and an

15. Id., art. 7(2)(a).
16. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶¶ 238-72 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.,
App. Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999).
17. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945,
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
18. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 498 (1948).
19. See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-AR72, ¶¶ 78, 140-41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., App.
Chamber, Oct 2, 1995); see also Van Schaack, supra note 3, at 819-33; Robinson, supra note 3, at
45-46.
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attack on a civilian population. This dilemma was resolved by the
ICTY Appeals Chamber, which in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic20 held
that “[t]he armed conflict requirement is satisfied by proof that there
was an armed conflict; that is all that the Statute requires, and in so
doing, it requires more than does customary international law.”21 This
finding is of significance in establishing the importance to be attached
to the Appeals Chamber’s construction of the ICTY Statute when
interpreting the Statute of the ICTR and the Rome Statute, in
particular concerning the nexus between the act and the attack on the
civilian population.22 If the Appeals Chamber had found that the
armed conflict requirement was a discreet element that needed to be
proven, it might have affected other elements of the definition of
crimes against humanity, giving rise to parallel jurisprudence on the
subject.
B. Requirement of Discriminatory Grounds in the ICTR Statute
A second difference between the Statutes of the ad hoc tribunals
is that, unlike the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute requires that
crimes against humanity be “committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
23
ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”
Although the text of the ICTY Statute did not require a crime
against humanity to have discriminatory grounds, based on comments
in the Report of the Secretary-General and statements by three
Security Council members after they voted on the Statute, the ICTY
Trial Chamber II found there to be such a requirement.24 The holding
was overturned on appeal. As noted by the Appeals Chamber,
Article 7 of the Rome Statute considered and rejected a similar
discrimination requirement.25 Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber
found that customary international law does not impose such a
requirement and nor do the extraneous materials relied on by the
Trial Chamber warrant a departure from the Statute’s clear wording.26
20. No. IT-94-1-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., App. Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999).
21. Id., ¶ 251.
22. See discussion infra Part III.B.4.
23. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3 (emphasis added).
24. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 652 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, May 7, 1997).
25. See id. ¶ 291; see also Van Schaack, supra note 3, at 841-45; Robinson, supra note 3, at
46-47.
26. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶¶ 273-305 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.,
App. Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999). Although the text of the ICTR Statute is clear, it bears noting

CHESTERMAN.DOC

312

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

06/22/00 8:19 PM

[Vol 10:307

C. “Widespread or Systematic” in the ICTR Statute
The English, Chinese, Russian, and Spanish versions of the ICTR
Statute require that an act be committed as part of a “widespread or
systematic” attack against a civilian population.27 By contrast, the
French text uses the words “généralisée et systématique,”28 and the
Arabic version uses similarly conjunctive language. The Rwandan
Tribunal dealt with this inconsistency in a footnote to the Prosecutor
29
v. Jean-Paul Akayesu judgment, asserting that, as “Customary
International Law requires only that the attack be either widespread
or systematic, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the French
version suffers from an error in translation.”30
Such an argument is problematic. Although the Akayesu
interpretation lessens the burden of proof on the Prosecutor, similarly
situated ad hoc Tribunals have tended to adopt the reasonable
interpretation most favorable to the accused (for example, with
respect to the elements of genocide).31 The question of whether the
requirements were conjunctive (widespread and systematic) or
disjunctive (widespread or systematic) was a lively topic of debate
during the July 1998 Diplomatic Conference, which adopted the
Rome Statute.32
In any case, an Akayesu-type approach seems unnecessary.
Despite holding that the requirements were alternatives, the Akayesu
court held that the April 1994 attack against the civilian population
had been both widespread and systematic.33 Trial Chamber II made a

that the burden on the Prosecutor to prove discriminatory grounds is supplemental to the
requirements of customary international law. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-963-T, § 2.3. (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999) (section references are
derived from the ICTR web page <www.ictr.org>).
27. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3 (emphasis added).
28. Statut Du Tribunal International Pout Le Rwanda, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR,
49th Sess., 3453th mtg., at art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
29. No. ICTR-96-4-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998).
30. Id., ¶ 579 n.144. The Rwandan Tribunal continues:
In the original French version of the Statute, these requirements were worded
cumulatively: ‘Dans le cadre dune adieux generalise et systematic’, thereby
significantly increasing the threshold for application of this provision. Since
Customary International Law requires only that the attack be either widespread or
systematic, there are sufficient reasons to assume that the French version suffers from
an error in translation.
Id.
31. See infra text accompanying note 128.
32. See Van Schaack, supra note 3, at 844; Robinson, supra note 3, at 47.
33. See No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 173 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998).
“[T]he Chamber finds beyond a reasonable doubt that a widespread and systematic attack
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similar finding in Prosecutor v. Kayishema.34 It was therefore open to
the Tribunal to affirm that, as a matter of customary international
law, the requirements were alternatives, while noting that on the
facts, even the stricter cumulative requirement would have been
satisfied. The disjunctive interpretation has been affirmed by the
Rwandan Tribunal in Kayishema35 and Prosecutor v. Rutaganda 36 and
seems unlikely to be reversed.37
The words “widespread or systematic” do not appear in the
ICTY Statute. Trial Chamber II held in Prosecutor v. Tadic,
however, that such a requirement was contemplated in the
requirement that the attack be directed against a civilian
“population.”38 As previously noted, it is now well settled as a matter
of customary international law that the two elements are alternatives.
This position was adopted by the Yugoslav Tribunal in the case
known as the Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision,39 and the matter
was explicitly decided by Trial Chamber II in Tadic40 and implicitly
affirmed on appeal.41 The phrase “widespread or systematic” is also
included in the definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome
Statute.42
began in April 1994 in Rwanda, targeting the civilian Tutsi population and that the acts referred
to in paragraphs 12-24 of the indictment were acts which formed part of this widespread and
systematic attack.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
34. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 582 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
35. Id. ¶ 123 n.63. “Despite the French text containing the conjunctive ‘and’ instead of the
disjunctive ‘or’ between the terms widespread or systematic, the Trial Chamber is in no doubt
that the correct interpretation is the disjunctive. The matter has already been settled in the
Akayesu Judgement and needs no further debate here.” Id.
36. No. ICTR-96-3-T, § 2.3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999).
37. Note, however, the obiter dicta a 1998 Yugoslav Tribunal judgment, which used the
conjunctive “and,” perhaps inadvertently. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 178 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998) (the case is known as Celebici).
“While the fact that these acts are not alleged to have occurred on a widespread and systematic
scale in this particular situation may have been of relevance had they been charged as crimes
against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute, there is no such requirement incorporated in
Articles 2 and 3, with which the Trial Chamber is here concerned.” Id. (emphasis added).
Compare this with the typographical error in Akayesu that refers to Article 7 of the Rome
Statute as requiring a “widespread of [sic] systematic attack.” No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 577 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998).
38. No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 648 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997).
39. Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Prosecutor v. Msksic, No. IT-95-13-R61, ¶ 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber,
Apr. 3, 1996) [hereinafter Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision].
40. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 646-48.
41. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.,
App. Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999).
42. Supra note 2, art. 7 (emphasis added).
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The requirements for a crime against humanity under the three
definitions may be summarized as follows. First, there are the general
requirements for an act to fall into the category of crimes against
humanity. The act must have been committed: (a) in armed conflict
(ICTY Statute only); (b) as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
(c) against any civilian population; and (d) on discriminatory grounds
(ICTR Statute only). Second, the act must constitute one of the
enumerated acts in Article 3(a)-(i). It should be highlighted that the
mental element for a crime against humanity incorporates two parts.
Initially, it is necessary to establish that the accused knew the context
in which his or her acts took place in order for it to be “part of” a
widespread or systematic attack. This is a discrete requirement in the
chapeaux of Article 7 in the Rome Statute.43 Next, one must establish
the mental element required for the specific act alleged. As will
become clear in the case of the ICTR Statute, it is not necessary to
prove a third element of subjective intent to discriminate on the part
of an accused.
III. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
A. Committed in Armed Conflict
As indicated above, the ICTY Statute’s requirement that an act
be “committed in armed conflict” is easily satisfied by establishing
that an armed conflict was taking place.44
B. Committed as Part of a Widespread or Systematic Attack
The requirement that an act be committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack is more complex. It is instructive to
isolate four elements of this concept: the definitions of “widespread
or systematic” and “attack,” and what have come to be called the
“policy” and “nexus” requirements. These will be considered in turn.
1. Widespread or systematic. From the above discussion, it is
clear that the terms “widespread” and “systematic” are considered to
be alternative requirements. “Widespread” refers to the number of
victims, whereas “systematic” refers to the existence of a policy or
43. Id., art. 7(1). “‘[C]rime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack.” Id. (emphasis added); see Robinson, supra note 3, at 51-52.
44. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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plan. The purpose of these requirements is to exclude isolated and
random acts from the category of crimes against humanity, and the
terms are included in the chapeaux of the relevant articles of the
ICTR and Rome Statutes.45 The Yugoslav Tribunal implied the
requirements from the use of the term “population,” as the term
indicated that the crimes committed were of a collective nature.46
It would be unhelpful to engage in the gruesome calculus of
establishing a minimum number of victims necessary to make an
attack “widespread.” In Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber I cited the
International Law Commission’s (ILC) commentary to its 1996 Draft
Code of Crimes to the effect that “widespread” may be defined as
“massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with
considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of
victims.”47 Similarly, Trial Chamber II in Kayishema understood
“widespread” to mean an attack “directed against a multiplicity of
victims.”48
In the same way, “systematic” is not susceptible to precise
definition. Again citing the ILC, Akayesu explained “systematic” as
“thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of
a common policy involving substantial public or private resources.”49
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema, a systematic attack was said to be one
“carried out pursuant to a preconceived policy or plan.”50
2. Attack. Unlike the ICTY Statute, an “attack” under the terms
of the Rwandan Tribunal bears no necessary relation to an armed
conflict. Instead, it refers to the context of the acts, which are
enumerated in Article 3, paragraphs (a) through (i) of the ICTR
Statute. In Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber I held that an attack may
be defined as an unlawful act of the kind enumerated in the ICTR
Statute, noting that an attack may be non-violent in nature.51 In
45. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 648 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, May 7, 1997).
46. See supra text accompanying note 38; see also Van Schaack, supra note 3, at 834-35.
47. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 580 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial
Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998).
48. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 123 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
49. No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 580.
50. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 123.
51. No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 581.
The concept of ‘attack’ maybe [sic] defined as a [sic] unlawful act of the kind
enumerated in Article 3(a) to (I) [sic] of the Statute, like murder, extermination,
enslavement etc. An attack may also be non violent in nature, like imposing a system
of apartheid, which is declared a crime against humanity in Article 1 of the Apartheid
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Kayishema, Trial Chamber II held that an attack is the event that
encompasses the enumerated crimes.52
Both definitions are
essentially circular. By contrast, the Rome Statute defines “attack” as
“a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of
[proscribed] acts . . . .”53
Because the combined force of these definitions indicate that the
act of an accused must form “part of” such an attack, it is possible to
view this as a requirement that more than one such act take place.
Nevertheless, it would be unwise to require multiple acts before one
act may be found. For example, it is possible that a single act of
extermination might be committed on such a scale as to amount to a
“widespread or systematic attack,” which constitutes a crime against
humanity.54 It would be perverse to hold that such an attack amounts
to a crime against humanity only upon proof of additional acts.
As used in the ICTR Statute, “attack” is best understood as
qualifying the words “widespread” and “systematic.” In this regard, it
refers to the context that elevates an act from the level of a domestic
crime to a crime against humanity. By itself, the term “attack” does
not add a discrete requirement to establish that an act was a crime
against humanity.
3. The policy requirement. Whether the attack is widespread,
systematic, or both, the relevant act or acts must be connected to
some form of policy. There is no requirement that the policy come
from the central government; the policy may be that of an
organization or other private group.55 This policy requirement
essentially reiterates the position that isolated and random acts
cannot amount to crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity
shock the conscience of mankind and warrant intervention by the
international community precisely because they are not isolated,

Convention of 1973, or exerting pressure on the population to act in a particular
manner, may come under the purview of an attack, if orchestrated on a massive scale
or in a systematic manner.
Id. This was affirmed in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, § 2.3 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Rwanda, Trial Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999).
52. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 122. “The attack is the event in which the enumerated crimes must
form part. Indeed, within a single attack, there may exist a combination of the enumerated
crimes, for example murder, rape and deportation.” Id.
53. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
54. Cf. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 649 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, May 7, 1997).
55. See id. ¶¶ 654-55; Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 125-26.
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random acts of individuals, but instead result from a deliberate
attempt to target a civilian population.56
4. The nexus requirement. The words “as part of” indicate the
need for a connection between the relevant act and a widespread or
systematic attack. Article 18 of the ILC’s Draft Code of Crimes
provides that crimes against humanity must be “instigated or directed
by a Government or by any organization or group.”57
Both the Tadic Trial Chamber decision58 and the Kayishema59
decision cite to the Draft Code’s “instigated or directed” expression,
suggesting that there is an additional requirement to prove this
element. The commentary accompanying the Draft Code of Crimes
(also cited in both judgments)60 provides that the inclusion of this
requirement was
intended to exclude the situation in which an individual commits an
inhumane act while acting on his own initiative pursuant to his own
criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or direction
from either a Government or a group or organization. This type of
isolated criminal conduct on the part of a single individual would
not constitute a crime against humanity . . . . The instigation or
direction of a Government or any organization or group, which
may or may not be affiliated with a Government, gives the act its
great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity imputable
61
to private persons or agents of a State.

When citing the Draft Code of Crimes, the Trial Chamber in Tadic
observed that this requirement was “more explicit” than the criteria
necessary to satisfy the policy requirement.62 The nexus test is also
more restrictive—indeed, it goes beyond that required by customary
international law. Importantly, the decisions of both the Trial
Chamber in Tadic and the Trial Chamber II in Kayishema left the
same sentence out of the commentary, denoting its absence with
ellipses:63 “[i]t would be extremely difficult for a single individual
acting alone to commit the inhumane acts as envisaged in Article
56. See Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 653.
57. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind: Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May–26 July 1996,
U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, art. 18, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/51/10/ (1996), revised by U.N.
Doc. A/51/10/Corr.1 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code of Crimes].
58. See Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 655.
59. See No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 125.
60. See id; Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 655.
61. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 57.
62. See No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 655.
63. See id.; Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 125.
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18.”64 One paragraph after it quoted the truncated ILC commentary,
the Tadic Trial Chamber directly contradicted the omitted material.
Referring to the Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision, the Trial
Chamber affirmed that, in fact, “a single act by a perpetrator can
constitute a crime against humanity.”65
Given that the Trial Chamber’s omission and its resultant
position run contrary to the apparent position of the ILC in the Draft
Code of Crimes, it is questionable whether the court may justifiably
rely on the Draft Code. This analysis is supported by an examination
of the recent Appeals Chamber decision in Tadic.66 The requirement
that an act be “instigated or directed” by a Government or
organization or group was closely related to the Trial Chamber’s
apparent finding in Tadic, specifically, that crimes against humanity
cannot be committed for “purely personal motives.”67 However, the
Appeals Chamber in Tadic held that there was no such requirement.68
In Tadic, the Appellate Chamber cited a number of examples
where, although acts for “purely personal motives” were found to be
crimes against humanity, the acts would have failed to meet the
requirements of a test that required proof that those acts were
“instigated or directed” by a government, organization, or group.69 In
particular, the Tadic appellate decision considered the so-called

64. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 57.
65. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 649.
66. No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 269–272 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App. Chamber, Jul. 15,
1999).
67. See No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 659 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997).
Thus if the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or constructive, that these acts
were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and does not commit his act for
purely personal motives completely unrelated to the attack on the civilian population,
that is sufficient to hold him liable for crimes against humanity. Therefore the
perpetrator must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, know that his
act fits in with the attack and the act must not be taken for purely personal reasons
unrelated to the armed conflict.
Id.
68. The Tadic Appeals Chamber stated that it did not believe
that the Trial Chamber meant to reach such a conclusion [that crimes against humanity
cannot be committed for “purely personal motives”]. Rather, the requirement that the
accused’s acts be part of a context of large-scale crimes, and that the accused knew of
this context, was misstated by the Trial Chamber as a negative requirement that the
accused not be acting for personal reasons. The Trial Chamber did not, the Appeals
Chamber believes, wish to import a ‘motive’ requirement; it simply duplicated the
context and mens rea requirement, and confused it with the need for a link with an
armed conflict, and thereby seemed to have unjustifiably and inadvertently added a
new requirement.
No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 269 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App. Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999).
69. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 655; No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 125.
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denunciation cases rendered after the Second World War.70 These
cases indicate that “instigated or directed” requires the act and the
widespread or systematic attack to have a tight connection—an even
closer nexus than required by customary international law. Following
the denunciation cases, “instigated or directed” implies some form of
causal link. However, this should not imply that where an accused is
found to have denounced another person for “purely personal
motives,” the act could not have been “instigated or directed.” For
example, during the Allied occupation of Germany 1945-1955, the
Supreme Court of the British Zone held that an accused was guilty of
a crime against humanity under Control Council Law No 10, when
after a tenancy dispute, the accused denounced her landlord solely
“out of revenge and for the purpose of rendering him harmless.”71
The Supreme Court held that an individual act may be transformed
into a crime against humanity
if the character, duration or extent of the prejudice were
determined by the National Socialist rule of violence and tyranny
or if a link between them existed. If the victim was harmed in his or
her human dignity, the incident was no longer an event that did not
concern mankind as such. If an individual’s attack against an
individual victim for personal reasons is connected to the National
Socialist rule of violence and tyranny and if the attack harms the
victim in the aforementioned way, it, too, becomes one link in the
chain of the measures which under the National Socialist rule were
intended to persecute large groups among the population. There is
no apparent reason to exonerate the accused only because he acted
72
against an individual victim for personal reasons.

On the basis of the earlier discussion of “widespread or
systematic,” it appears that the concerns expressed in the ILC’s
commentary accompanying the Draft Code of Crimes do not require
the addition of “instigated or directed” to exclude “isolated criminal
conduct on the part of a single individual.”73 Similarly, the Rome

70. See id., ¶ 259–62.
71. Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone in Strafsachen
[Decision of the Supreme Court of the British Zone] 1 (1948), 122.
72. Id.
73. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 57. Cf. Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind: Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
art. 2(11), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinted in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 140, at 150
(“inhuman acts” punishable under this draft code were limited to acts “by the authorities of a
State or by private individuals acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such
authorities”)(emphasis added). But cf. Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, Prosecutor v. Nikolic, No. IT-94-2-R61, ¶ 26 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo. Trial Chamber I, Oct. 20, 1995).
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Statute includes no requirement of instigation or direction.74 Instead,
its definition refers to the attack as being “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such
attack.”75 This is clearly broader than a requirement that an
individual act be instigated or directed by that policy, and would
appear to encompass circumstances such as the denunciation cases.
In order to be a crime against humanity, it is not necessary to
prove a causal connection, namely that an act was “instigated or
directed by a Government or by any organization or group.” Instead,
the requirements are closer to those adopted by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Tadic. In that case, the Appeals Chamber held that there
are two elements which must be proved to satisfy the nexus
requirement: (1) the alleged crimes were related to the attack on a
civilian population; and (2) the accused knew that his or her crimes
were so related.76 This test appears to reflect customary international
law, and is consistent with the provisions of the Rome Statute. The
two elements will be considered in turn.
a. Related to the widespread or systematic attack. Where an act
was in fact instigated or directed by the relevant policy, the relation
requirement is clearly satisfied. The relationship exists, for example,
where soldier A murders a person of the Utopian ethnic group when
asked (or ordered) to do so as part of a widespread or systematic
attack. Similarly, where B murders a Utopian because he hears
organized propaganda calling for the death of Utopians, his act is
related to the propaganda attack. The definition adopted here would
also encompass broader situations. If, taking advantage of the
widespread killing of Utopians, C rids herself of a troublesome
Utopian business associate by publically denouncing her as a
Utopian, that act may be related to the attack without requiring proof
that her act was instigated by the attack. However, the definition has
its limits. Where D takes advantage of the confusion during the
conflict to kill an elderly relative who was not a Utopian, his act
would not amount to a crime against humanity. Although this is
murder, it lacks the necessary connection to a widespread or

74. See supra note 2, art. 7(2)(a).
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App.
Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999). The ICTY Statute imposes an additional requirement that the act must
occur during an armed conflict. See id.
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systematic attack against a civilian population that would transform a
domestic crime into a crime against humanity.
b. With knowledge of the relation to the widespread or systematic
attack. Because it is this context that transforms an individual’s act
into a crime against humanity, an accused must be aware of this
context in order to be culpable of such a crime.77 Actual or
78
constructive knowledge is enough. In R. v. Finta, the Canadian
Supreme Court held that the accused must be aware of or willfully
blind to facts or circumstances that would bring his or her acts within
the scope of a crime against humanity.79 In the hypothetical situations
indicated above, it is clear that this requirement would be satisfied in
relation to A, B, and C, but it would not arise in relation to D. Nor
would the requirement be satisfied in the case of E who, while living
in a remote community with no knowledge of the ongoing conflict,
kills a Utopian in order to take her property. Finally, as was held by
the Tadic Appeals Chamber, the fact that an act was taken for
“purely personal motives” is irrelevant to the question of whether the
act constituted a crime against humanity.80
C. Directed Against Any Civilian Population
All three Statutes under consideration contain the words
“against any civilian population”. Some scholars posit that whereas
this qualifies the act in the ICTY Statute, in the ICTR Statute it
qualifies the attack.81 On this basis, the ICTR Statute may require
that to invoke Article 3, a substantial number of inhumane acts need
to have been committed.82 In light of the above discussion of the
terms “widespread or systematic attack,” however, it appears that the
jurisprudence of the Yugoslav Tribunal incorporates the requirement
that an act be committed as part of a widespread and systematic
attack.83 Moreover, as this Article has discussed, the word “attack”

77. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 134 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber, May 21, 1999).
78. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
79. See id. at 706. This and other supporting cases were cited in Tadic. No. IT-94-1-T, ¶
657 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997).
80. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 270 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App.
Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999). But see Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 122.
81. See, e.g., Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda 194–96 (1998).
82. See id.
83. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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does not add any discrete requirement.84 It is therefore submitted
that it is in fact the widespread or systematic context of the act that
must be directed against the civilian population. In principle, this
means that the victims or intended victims must be civilians, though it
raises questions about the meanings of the terms “civilian” and
“population.”
1. Definition of civilians. The inclusion of the word “civilians”
reflects the origins of the expression “crimes against humanity” in the
Second World War. In both Akayesu and Kayishema, the Rwandan
Tribunal largely followed the Tadic Trial Chamber decision in
adopting the definition of “civilian” used in the context of armed
conflict.85 Because the ICTR Statute does not require the existence of
an armed conflict, however, it was necessary to adopt a definition that
would also apply in times of relative peace. In Kayishema, ICTR
Trial Chamber II stated that it
considers that a wide definition of civilian is applicable and, in the
context of the situation of Kibuye Prefecture where there was no
armed conflict, includes all persons except those who have the duty
to maintain public order and have the legitimate means to exercise
force. Non-civilians would include, for example, members of the
86
FAR, the RPF, the police and the Gendarmerie Nationale.

Although the policy in the first clause and the factual conclusions
drawn in the remainder of the quote are individually correct, by
conflating the two issues, the statement substantially narrows the
definition of “civilian”—most notably by limiting the class of
“civilians” to a substantially smaller group than would be the case
during armed conflict. The limitation of the term “civilian” to mean
only “those who have the duty to maintain public order and have the
legitimate means to exercise force”87 should not be understood as a
general statement of law. Rather, it merely reflects Trial Chamber
II’s understanding of the particular situation in Kibuye Prefecture.
Because the terms “civilian” and “civilian population” are terms
of art in international humanitarian law, it is appropriate for the
terms to find their meanings within the context of both international
and non-international armed conflict. On the basis of this analysis, it
will be possible to find a meaning more appropriate to situations
84. See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
85. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 582 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998); Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 127–29.
86. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 127 (emphasis in original).
87. Id.
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where there is no armed conflict. Additional Protocol I (relating to
international armed conflicts) defines a “civilian” as a person who
does not belong to the armed forces.88 The Commentary on the
Additional Protocol I shows that there was some debate over whether
to include police forces within the definition of “armed forces.”89 The
problem was particularly acute because some states provide for
automatic incorporation of police forces into their armed forces
during times of war, whereas in other states, the roles of internal lawkeeper and combatant are regarded as incompatible. In the end, the
terms “para-military” and “armed law enforcement agency” were
substituted for the term “police forces” in the definition of armed
forces.90 In keeping with this distinction, Article 59 prohibits attacks
on non-defended localities and specifically provides that the presence
of “police forces retained for the sole purpose of maintaining law and
order” does not alter a locality’s status as “non-defended.”91 The
Commentary provides that
[a]s regards police forces left behind in the locality, this can only
refer to members of uniformed police units which form part of the
armed forces of the State as laid down in paragraph 3 of Article 43
(Armed forces). In fact the civilian police force falls under the
civilian population and therefore does not need to be evacuated
92
when the locality is declared a non-defended locality.

Additional Protocol II, which applies to non-international armed
conflicts, refers to “armed forces” in the description of its material
field of application.93 The Commentary states that this term should be
understood “in the broadest sense,” and that
[i]n fact, this term was chosen in preference to others suggested
such as, for example, “regular armed forces”, in order to cover all
the armed forces, including those not included in the definition of
the army in the national legislation of some countries (national
94
guard, customs, police forces or any other similar forces).

88. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8, 1977, art.
50(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
89. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12, 1949, 517–18 [hereinafter COMMENTARY].
90. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, at 23 (art. 43); COMMENTARY, supra note 89.
91. See id. at 30 (art. 59); see also id. at 31 (art. 60(4)) (referring to “demilitarized zones”).
92. COMMENTARY, supra note 89, at 702–03.
93. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature June 8,
1977, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 608, 611 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
94. COMMENTARY, supra note 89, at 1352.
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These definitions of the term “armed forces” may appear
contradictory but, in fact, merely reflect the different purposes for
which the term is employed. In Additional Protocol I, a narrow
definition of “armed forces” expands the protection to civilians
during an international armed conflict. In Additional Protocol II, the
term “armed forces” affects the scope of protection in precisely the
opposite way—a broader definition of “armed forces” expands the
situations in which Additional Protocol II will apply. In the context
of crimes against humanity, the most appropriate definition of
“civilian” is the broader usage employed by Additional Protocol I.
This definition even accords with the fundamental guarantees of
Additional Protocol II, which apply to “[a]ll persons who do not take
a direct part or who have ceased to take part in hostilities.”95 It is thus
convenient to distinguish between three situations: (a) international
armed conflict; (b) non-international armed conflict; and (c) no
armed conflict.
a. International armed conflict. In the context of an international
armed conflict, a “civilian” is defined in the Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I as a person who is not a member of the armed
forces of any party to the conflict.96 This definition reflects the clarity
of the term “civilian” within international humanitarian law, as
applicable to international armed conflicts.
b. Non-international armed conflict. In the context of a noninternational armed conflict, a “civilian” is a person who is not taking
a direct part or who has ceased to take part in hostilities.97 This
definition reflects the different usage of the term “armed forces” in
Additional Protocol II and “civilians” are drawn instead from the
category of persons to whom the fundamental guarantees apply. This
category of civilians would exclude, for example, active members of
non-state armed forces and police who take part in actions against a
civilian population.
c. No armed conflict. Where there is no armed conflict within
the meaning of the Geneva Conventions and their protocols, it is
necessary to extrapolate from the preceding two situations. It would
be inappropriate to adopt the definition used in international armed

95. Additional Protocol II, supra note 93, at 62, art. 4(1).
96. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, and accompanying text.
97. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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conflict, since that definition is significant primarily because of the
complementary nature of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The more appropriate definition parallels the category of persons to
whom the fundamental guarantees of Additional Protocol II apply.
Thus, where there is no armed conflict, a civilian is a person who is
not taking a direct part in or who has ceased to take part in the
relevant hostilities. This category of civilians will exclude, for
example, police who take part in actions against a civilian population.
2. Population. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute requires that the
prohibited acts be directed against any civilian “population.”98 This
was interpreted in the Tadic Trial Chamber decision as requiring that
the prohibited acts be part of a widespread or systematic attack.99
Obviously, there is no need to read such a requirement into the ICTR
Statute (or the Rome Statute).
Because the term “population” occurs in the ICTR Statute as
part of the phrase “attack against any civilian population on national,
political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,”100 it could mistakenly be
interpreted as requiring the targeted population to represent a
specific group. However, this interpretation is not supported by
international humanitarian law’s definition, where the “[t]he civilian
population comprises all persons who are civilians.”101 Furthermore,
it has already been noted that the requirement of “discriminatory
grounds” is a requirement of the ICTR Statute, which goes beyond
customary international law.102 It is appropriate, therefore, to
consider this element separately and distinctly from other
considerations that are held to reflect customary international law. In
accordance with customary international law, the ICTR statute uses
the term “population” to encompass more than a specific group
within the target population.
The better view is that the term “population” should be used
more loosely. Rather than requiring an attack to be directed against
“civilians,” reference to a “civilian population” has the effect of
incorporating the definitions of “population” from international
humanitarian law. Accordingly, the presence of individuals who do

98. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
99. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 644–48 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Trial
Chamber, May 7, 1997).
100. ICTY Statute, supra note 6.
101. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, at 26 (art. 50(2)).
102. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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not come within the definition of “civilians” does not deprive a
population of its civilian character.103 This view is supported by
Additional Protocol I, which provides that “[t]he civilian population
comprises all persons who are civilians.”104 The use of the term “any
civilian population” in the three statutes avoids an inference that it is
the civilian population as a whole that must be targeted.
D. On Discriminatory Grounds
As indicated in Part II.B, the ICTR Statute’s discriminatory
grounds condition exceeds the requirements of customary
international law for crimes against humanity. The inclusion of the
words “on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”105 in
Article 3 raises two important questions of interpretation. First, is it
the “attack” (understood as the widespread or systematic context of
the act in question) or the individual act itself that must be committed
on discriminatory grounds?
Second, does the requirement
incorporate some additional mental element by requiring
discriminatory intent on the part of an accused? The question of
discrimination was dealt with briefly in Akayesu106 and Rutaganda,107
but in Kayishema, Trial Chamber II made the following observations:
Firstly, in a scenario where the perpetrator’s intention is to
exterminate the Tutsi group and, in furtherance of this intent, he
kills a Belgium [sic] Priest who is protecting the Tutsi, the Trial
Chamber opines that such an act would be based on discrimination
against the Tutsi group.
. . . [Secondly,] where the perpetrator attacks people on the
grounds and in the belief that they are members of a group but, in
fact, they are not, for example, where the perpetrator believes that
a group of Tutsi are supporters of the RPF and therefore
accomplices. In the scenario, the Trial Chamber opines that the
Prosecution must show that the perpetrator’s belief was objectively
reasonable—based upon real facts—rather than being mere
108
speculation or perverted deduction.

103. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, at 26 (art. 50(3)). Cf. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T,
¶ 638; Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 582 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 128 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Rwanda Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
104. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, at 26 (art. 50(2)) (emphasis added).
105. See ICTR Statute, supra note 7.
106. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 583–84.
107. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 71–74 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999).
108. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 131–32.
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It is clear that Trial Chamber II deemed it necessary to prove some
form of the accused’s discriminatory intent to commit a prohibited
act. This requirement is consistent with the dicta in the Tadic
Appeals Chamber decision that asserted that (unlike Article 5 of the
ICTY Statute) Article 3 of the ICTR Statute requires “a
discriminatory intent for all crimes against humanity.”109 Some of the
delegates on PrepCom supported this view.110
Nevertheless, these observations are merely illustrative. While
they do not purport to outline the requirements for discrimination,
they do indicate two important factors. First, it is the element of
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity (in this case) that is required,
rather than the specific ethnicity of the victim. Of course, this
discrimination does not require the intent to exterminate a particular
ethnic group. Indeed, the use of the term “intent” is misleading. A
person who denounces a Tutsi relative for “purely personal motives”
may commit a crime against humanity even though she does not
intend to discriminate against Tutsis as such.111
This is supported by an examination of one of the few cases (as
pointed out in the Tadic Appeals Chamber decision)112 in which
discrimination was held to be a necessary element of crimes against
humanity. In R. v. Finta,113 the Supreme Court of Canada stated that
“with respect to crimes against humanity the additional element is
that the inhumane acts were based on discrimination against or the
persecution of an identifiable group of people.”114 However, Justice
Cory (on behalf of the majority) went on to state that “[w]hat
distinguishes a crime against humanity from any other criminal
offense under the Canadian Criminal Code is that the cruel and
terrible actions which are essential elements of the offense were
undertaken in pursuance of a policy of discrimination or persecution
of an identifiable group or race.”115 There is, therefore, no reason to
109. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 274 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. App.
Chamber, Jul. 15, 1999).
110. See Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee During the Period 25
March–12 April 1996, U.N. GAOR, Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, at 16–17, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1 (1996). Some delegates argued
that crimes against humanity required proof of the defendant’s discriminatory animus; others
argued that “the inclusion of such a criterion would complicate the task of the prosecution by
significantly increasing its burden of proof in requiring evidence of this subjective element.” Id.
111. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
112. See Tadic, No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 290.
113. [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701.
114. Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 814.
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require proof of subjective intent on the part of an accused to
discriminate against a particular group on national, political, ethnic,
racial, or religious grounds. It is only necessary that the “attack”
(understood as the widespread or systematic context of the act in
question) discriminates on one or more of those bases.116
It is only through such an interpretation that Article 3(h) of the
ICTR Statute has any meaning. Article 3(h) refers to “[p]ersecutions
on political, racial and religious grounds.”117 While the term
“persecution” incorporates some element of discriminatory intent,
there is no such necessary implication in the phrase “widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political,
ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”118 In relation to the second
observation quoted from Kayishema, it is indeed possible that a
distinct “widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian
population” could include a discriminatory element that is premised
on a mistake (such as the belief that a particular group of Tutsi
civilians is supporting the Rwandese Patriotic Front). In the context
of such an attack, however, it is not necessary to inquire into the
subjective state of mind of the accused.
IV. REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIFIC CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
Having elaborated the general requirements of crimes against
humanity, this Part will examine attempts to define the specific
elements of individual offenses. The focus will be on three offenses
that have received relatively detailed consideration particularly in the
Rwandan Tribunal: murder, extermination, and rape.119
A. Murder
1. Assassinat or meurtre? A preliminary question confronting
the crime of murder under the ICTY Statute and the ICTR Statute is
whether it corresponds to the French concept of assassinat or meurtre.
The French versions of both Statutes (which are as authoritative as

116. Additionally, the accused must have actual or constructive knowledge of the context of
his or her act to satisfy the “knowledge” requirement. See discussion supra Part III.B.4.b.
117. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3(h).
118. ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 3.
119. See also Robinson, supra note 3, at 52–54 (elaborating on persecution, enforced
disappearance, apartheid and other inhumane acts).

CHESTERMAN.DOC

2000]

06/22/00 8:19 PM

AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT ORDER

329

the English editions)120 use the term assassinat.
Assassinat
corresponds to meurtre aggravé (aggravated murder) and would
restrict Article 5(a) of the ICTY Statute and Article 3(a) of the ICTR
Statute to only intentional and premeditated killings, thus excluding
“reckless” murder.121
In the Rwandan Tribunal,122 Trial Chambers I and II have taken
differing positions on this issue, and of the two, Trial Chamber I’s
interpretation is less persuasive. In Akayesu, Trial Chamber I held
that because customary international law dictates that it is the act of
“murder” (as opposed to the more restrictive act of assassinat) that
constitutes a crime against humanity,123 the inclusion of assassinat in
the French version of the Statute must be due to an error in
translation.124 But here, there is no clear error of translation. In fact,
as pointed out by Trial Chamber II in Kayishema,125 by including
assassinat, the French version of the ICTR Statute merely reflects the
text of the ICTY Statute, and more importantly, both the ICTR and
TCTY statutes draw on the text of Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg
Charter.126
On the other hand, Trial Chamber I was correct in stating that
customary international law presently requires the standard reflected
by meurtre rather than by assassinat. Reflecting this distinction, the
Rome Statute uses the French term meurtre in Article 7(1). Given
the apparent conflict between customary international law and the
literal terms of the ICTR Statute, the question shifts to which
authority the Tribunal is obliged to follow.

120. See PROVISIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AS AMENDED
21 DEC. 1982, at rule 41, U.N. Doc. S/96/Rev.7, U.N. Sales No. E.83.I.4 (1983).
121. See infra notes 122–29 and accompanying text.
122. Until January 2000, the Yugoslav Tribunal had not defined murder in this context,
although two defendants have been convicted after pleading guilty to a count of crimes against
humanity (murder). See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, No. IT-96-22-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo. Trial Chamber I, Nov. 29, 1996); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, No. IT-95-10-T (Int’l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo. Trial Chamber I, Dec. 14, 1999); see also infra notes 139–40.
123. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 588 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, § 2.3 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. Rwanda Trial Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, ¶ 214
(Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial Chamber I, Jan. 27, 2000).
124. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 588.
125. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 138 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial Chamber, May 21, 1999).
126. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c),
82 U.N.T.S. 284. In addition, the Canadian Criminal Code uses “assassinat” in its definition of
crimes against humanity. See R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 7 (1985) (Can.).
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In the absence of a clear translation error, the Tribunal should
apply the version more favorable to the accused. This is particularly
important when the accused is relying on the French version of the
Statute—as was largely the case in Rwanda. Because “meurtre”
imposes a higher burden of proof than would “killing,” in Akayesu,
the Trial Chamber held that the version more favorable to the
accused should be applied.127 In relation to genocide, the ICTR and
ICTY statutes have already adopted the position most favorable to
the accused. Both their articles on genocide refer to “killing members
of the group,” and their respective French versions refer to “meurtre
128
de membres du groupe.”
Moreover, in the travaux préparatoires of the statutes for the
ICTY and ICTR, the English term “murder” has involved some
uncertainty as to its use in reference to crimes against humanity. In
the Secretary-General’s report that presaged the ICTY Statute, the
explanatory paragraph to Article 5 opts to use the term “wilful
killing” instead, stating that “[c]rimes against humanity refer to
inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture
or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds.”129
Given the uncertainty over the terminology in relation to crimes
against humanity, the ad hoc Tribunals should acknowledge that the
appropriate crime under their Statutes is that of assassinat, but note at
the same time that meurtre now reflects customary international law.
2. Requirements for murder.
unhelpfully provides that

The 1996 ILC Draft Code

[m]urder is a crime that is clearly understood and well defined in
the national law of every State. This prohibited act does not
require any further explanation. Murder was included as a crime
against humanity in the Nürnberg Charter (Article 6 (c)), Control
Council Law No. 10 (Article II, paragraph c), the Statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
(Article 5) and Rwanda (Article 3) as well as the Nürnberg

127. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 501; see also Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶¶ 44–62.
128. ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 4; ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 2. The wording of
the ICTR and ICTY statutes reflects that of the Genocide Convention. See Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
129. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (emphasis added).
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Principles (Principle VI) and the 1954 draft Code (Article 2,
130
paragraph 11).

Given that murder and assassinat are equated in the above
documents, this definition needs refinement.
In Akayesu and Rutaganda, ICTR Trial Chamber I defined the
requisite elements of murder:
1. the victim is dead;
2. the death resulted from an unlawful act or omission of the
accused or a subordinate;
3. at the time of the killing the accused or a subordinate had the
intention to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm on the deceased
having known that such bodily harm is likely to cause the
victim’s death, and is reckless whether death ensures or not.
Murder must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population. The victim must be a member
of this civilian population. The victim must have been murdered
because he was discriminated against on national, ethnic, racial,
131
political or religious grounds.

The Trial Chamber’s definition should not be retained. First,
reference to “a subordinate” is inappropriate and confusing. Article
6 of the ICTR Statute provides for individual criminal
responsibility,132 and it is not necessary to incorporate command
responsibility into specific offenses. Following Trial Chamber I’s
definition, if a subordinate of the accused possessed the requisite
intention to kill, the supervisory accused would be guilty of murder
even if he or she accidentally killed. Second, the court failed to
130. Draft Code of Crimes, supra note 57.
131. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 589-90, affirmed by Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, § 2.3;
Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, No. ICTR-96-13-T, ¶ 215 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial
Chamber I, Jan. 27, 2000).
132. See ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 6. Article 6 provides:
(1) A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in Articles 2 to
4 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.
(2) The official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
(3) The fact that any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal
responsibility if he or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about
to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
(4)The fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an order of a Government or of a
superior shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility, but may be considered
in mitigation of punishment if the International Tribunal for Rwanda determines that
justice so requires.
Id.
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adequately elaborate on the third element’s requirement of mens rea.
Although the common law definition of reckless murder (gross
negligence) appears to be intended as an alternative to murder with
intent, the use of the phrase “and is reckless whether death ensures or
not” creates ambiguity. This discussion of mens rea in the third
element contradicts the definition of murder as the “intentional killing
of a human being.” Finally, the requirement that the victim “must
have been murdered because he was discriminated against” is unclear
and, on the basis of the above discussion, unnecessary; in particular, it
appears to incorporate a motive requirement that might be construed
to exclude “purely personal” murders.133
In Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Trial Chamber II provides a
definition that better reflects the meaning of premeditated murder
(assassinat) in the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR:
The accused is guilty of murder if the accused, engaging in conduct
which is unlawful:
1. causes the death of another;
2. by a premeditated act or omission;
3. intending to kill any person or,
134
4. intending to cause grievous bodily harm to any person.

Although the numbering is ambiguous, it is clear that (3) and (4) are
alternatives, one of which is required with both (1) and (2). The
reference to “any person” covers transferred malice (where A shoots
at B, intending to kill him, but instead kills C). The requirement of
premeditation reflects the Nouveau code pénal français definition of
assassinat: “Murder committed with premeditation constitutes an
assassination. It is punished with life imprisonment.”135 While Trial
Chamber II’s definition improves on that by Trial Chamber I, it calls
into question the significance of the qualification “premeditated.”
Under French law, it is clear that premeditation is an aggravating
circumstance, as clearly indicated in the definition of assassinat; a
comparable distinction is found in the American categories of first
and second degree murder. If it is accepted that premeditation is a
necessary part of murder (assassinat), then it is necessary to provide a
definition.

133. Cf. discussion supra Part III.B.4.
134. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 140. (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber, 1999).
135. “Le meurtre commis avec prémeditation constitute un assassinat. Il est puni de la
réclusion criminelle à perpetuité.” NOUVEAU CODE PÉNAL [N.C. PÉN.] (Fr.), arts. 221-23, quoted
in Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 137 n.74 (author’s translation).

CHESTERMAN.DOC

2000]

06/22/00 8:19 PM

AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT ORDER

333

Trial Chamber II elaborated on the definition of
“premeditation” by stating that “[t]he result is premeditated when the
actor formulated his intent to kill after a cool moment of
reflection.”136 The phrase “cool moment of reflection” may, however,
be confusing. The Nouveau code pénal français defines premeditation
as “the intention formed before the action to commit a crime or a
given offense.”137 The Latin root of premeditation is praemeditatio,
from the verb praemeditare, which means “to prepare oneself for a
reflection.”
The best definition would include an objective
requirement that such intention must precede the killing by a length
of time sufficient to permit reflection. This definition would comply
with the French and American authorities, but does not require nor
suggest the necessity of a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of
the accused.
On January 14, 2000, the ICTY handed down its Prosecutor v.
138
Kupreskic judgment, giving somewhat ambiguous support to the
ICTR Trial Chamber II’s interpretation of murder. In Kupreskic, the
ICTY cited Akayesu with apparent approval in identifying the
constituent elements of murder:
They comprise the death of the victim as a result of the acts or
omissions of the accused, where the conduct of the accused was a
substantial cause of the death of the victim. It can be said that the
accused is guilty of murder if he or she engaging in conduct which is
unlawful, intended to kill another person or to cause this person
139
grievous bodily harm, and has caused the death of that person.

The ICTY Trial Chamber went on to note, however, that
[t]he requisite mens rea of murder under Article 5(a) is the intent to
kill or the intent to inflict serious injury in reckless disregard of
human life. In Kayishema it was noted that the standard of mens
rea required is intentional and premeditated killing. The result is
premeditated when the actor formulated his intent to kill after a
cool moment of reflection. The result is intended when it is the
actor’s purpose, or the actor is aware that it will occur in the
140
ordinary course of events.

This appears to support the position that the law of the Statutes
should reflect the higher burden of proof imposed by the term

136. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 139.
137. “Le dessein formé avant l’action de commettre un crime ou un délit déterminé.” [N.C.
PÉN.], arts. 132-72 (author’s translation).
138. No. IT-95-16-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber II, 2000).
139. Id., ¶ 560.
140. Id., ¶ 561.
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“assassinat,” though without implying the same of customary
international law.
3. Summary of requirements for murder. In addition to the
general requirements for a crime against humanity, the following
actus reus and mens rea must be satisfied for a conviction of murder:
 Actus reus: The accused, by his or her unlawful act or
omission, caused the death of another.
 Mens rea: One of the following mental elements is satisfied: (1)
the accused intended to cause the death of any person, or
(2) the accused intended to cause grievous bodily harm to
any person.
For the purposes of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, the act or omission
must also be premeditated. This requirement will be satisfied if such
intention precedes the act or omission by a length of time sufficient to
permit reflection.
B. Extermination
1. The rationale for extermination as a crime against humanity.
As with murder, the most significant pronouncements on the crime of
extermination have come from the Rwandan Tribunal. Once again,
however, Trial Chambers I and II have adopted inconsistent
positions. In Akayesu and Rutaganda, Trial Chamber I held that
extermination is a crime against humanity, pursuant to Article 3(c)
of the Statute. Extermination is a crime which by its very nature is
directed against a group of individuals. Extermination differs from
murder in that it requires an element of mass destruction which is
141
not required for murder.

The Chamber defined the essential elements of extermination:
1. the accused or his subordinate participated in the killing of
certain named or described persons;
2. the act or omission was unlawful and intentional.
3. the unlawful act or omission must be part of a widespread or
systematic attack;
4. the attack must be against the civilian population;
5. the attack must be on discriminatory grounds, namely: national,

141. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 591-92 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda
Trial Chamber, Sep. 2, 1998), affirmed by Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, § 2.3
(Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda Trial Chamber I, Dec. 6, 1999). Extermination is included in Article
3(b) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 7.
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142

The Chamber’s definition of extermination is flawed and
fundamentally unhelpful. First, as discussed in Part IV.A.2 in relation
to murder, reference to a subordinate is inappropriate.143 Reference
to “participat[ion]” in the killing of certain persons appears to suggest
either that more than one person must be involved in the killing or
that ancillary offenses such as aiding and abetting in the substantive
offense may be incorporated into its definition. Moreover, as will be
discussed below, reference to “intentional” sets an inappropriately
high mens rea. Similarly, reference to “unlawful” may exclude actions
that should be punishable under extermination, such as deprivation of
food from a civilian population. Finally, elements three through five
merely restate the general requirements for a crime against humanity.
Extermination is not simply “murder on a mass scale.” As Cherif
Bassiouni explains,
extermination implies intentional and unintentional killing. The
reason for the latter is that mass killing of a group of people
involves planning and implementation by a number of persons who,
though knowing and wanting the intended result, may not
necessarily know their victims. Furthermore, such persons may not
perform the actus reus that produced the deaths, nor have specific
144
intent toward a particular victim.

Although Bassiouni’s quote overlaps with the accessory offenses
provided for elsewhere in all three Statutes, the thrust of his
interpretation is borne out in the Rome Statute, which provides an
illustration of extermination: ‘[e]xtermination’ includes the
intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of
access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction
of part of a population . . . .”145 After quoting Bassiouni and the
Rome Statute, Trial Chamber II in Kayishema summarized that the
requisite elements of extermination:
[t]he actor participates in the mass killing of others or in the
creation of conditions of life that lead to the mass killing of others,
through his act(s) or omission(s); having intended the killing, or
being reckless, or grossly negligent as to whether the killing would
result and; being aware that his act(s) or omission(s) forms part of a
142. See Akayesu, ¶¶ 591-92.
143. See ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 6.
144. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1st ed. 1992), quoted in
Prosecutor v. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 143. (Int’l Crim. Trib. Rwanda, Trial Chamber,
1999) [hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY]; see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 302 (2d. ed. 1999).
145. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(b), quoted in Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶143.
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mass killing event; where, he [sic] act(s) or omission(s) forms part
of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
146
on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.

With this elaboration, Trial Chamber II greatly improves upon the
definition of extermination provided by Trial Chamber I.
In particular, through the crime of extermination, the law can
punish and deter the mass killing of civilians where the killing would
not match the crimes of genocide or murder. Such a distinction is
particularly important given the limited definition of murder
(assassinat) embodied in crimes against humanity (at least for the
purposes of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR). Two examples
illustrate acts that would not amount to murder or genocide but
would meet extermination’s criteria:
 D orders the incarceration of 1,000 members of a town because
he believes that the town has provided food to members of a
rebel force. D then withholds food and water in reckless
disregard as to whether this kills the detainees. Many die. (D
may be guilty of additional crimes for his conduct in relation to
those who survive.)
 In an area with food rationing, E orders that no ration tickets
be given to members of one political party. Many die.
Arguably, an implication of the foregoing analysis is that Jean-Paul
Akayesu’s conviction might have fallen more comfortably under the
scope of premeditated murder (assassinat) or genocide. In particular,
his ordering the deaths of certain named persons who were later
killed corresponds to assassinat. Where such killing took place with
an intention to destroy the Tutsi population, in whole or in part, it
amounts to genocide.147
2. Requirements for extermination. The requirements for
extermination should reflect the policy considerations discussed
above, covering situations in which large numbers of people are killed
by conduct that may not in itself amount to premeditated murder
(assassinat) or genocide, but should nevertheless be punished as a
crime against humanity. In terms of the actus reus, two elements need
to be considered: the necessity of scale, and the level of involvement
of the accused.

146. Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 144.
147. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 735-44. This is a distinct question from whether an
accused should be convicted of more than one offense in relation to the same set of facts.
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It is only in the actus reus that extermination equates with
murder “on a massive scale.”148 For both, a “large number” of people
must be killed.149 ICTR Trial Chamber I found Jean-Paul Akayesu
guilty of extermination for ordering the execution of sixteen people.150
As noted earlier in the discussion of “widespread,” it is inappropriate
to put a specific number to the term “mass killing.”151 In Kayishema,
Trial Chamber II made reference to a “mass killing event.”152 This
served to clarify that there must be some connection between the
deaths, a purpose that may be served more simply by reference to
their proximity in time or space. For example, in Nazi Germany, “an
extermination” might refer to conditions in a camp. It would be
inappropriate to refer to the conditions in Germany as a whole as “an
extermination.”
The second element concerns the involvement of the accused.
The decisions in both Akayesu and Kayishema include forms of the
word “participate” in the requirements for extermination, thus
confusing the substantive and ancillary offenses. If a person aids and
abets murder, that person is guilty of aiding and abetting murder
under the forms of participation.153 It appears that the use of the term
“participate” was intended to address the question of culpability
when many people are killed, but their deaths cannot be traced to
individual responsibility. Thus, Bassiouni writes that an accused
“may not perform the actus reus that produced the deaths, nor have
specific intent toward a particular victim.”154 The actus reus should
not be expanded in this way.
As discussed later, although
extermination requires a lesser mens rea requirement than murder,
this is balanced by the requirement that the actus reus involve “mass
killing.” It is also inappropriate to extend the actus reus to include
what would otherwise be ancillary (or “participatory”) offenses: the
148. Note that this limits Trial Chamber II’s statement in Kayishema. No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶
142 (“The Chamber agrees that the difference between murder and extermination is the scale;
extermination can be said to be murder on a massive scale.”).
149. Id., ¶ 146.
150. See Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 735-44.
151. See Kayishema, No. ICTR-95-1-T, ¶ 145.
152. Id. ¶ 144.
153. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 6(1); Rome
Statute, supra note 2, art. 25(3)(c). The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR also provide for the
separate offense of complicity to commit genocide. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 4(3)(e);
ICTR Statute, supra note 7, art. 2(3)(e). This provision of an ancillary offense in addition to the
forms of participation reflects the wholesale inclusion of articles of the Genocide Convention in
the two Statutes. This may be compared with the Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 25.
154. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, supra note 144.
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actus reus should require more than participation. At the same time,
however, “caused” may present too high a threshold for a crime that
will normally involve more than one person. The appropriate level of
involvement of the accused is reflected by using the phrase
“contributed directly” in the definition of extermination’s actus reus.
Once it is established that extermination applies to situations
where an accused has contributed directly to the mass killing of
others, the question of mens rea is simplified—the mens rea definition
should include “intent” to cause the mass killing. As has already
been observed, however, extermination may occur in circumstances
where there is no specific intent with regard to certain victims. It is
therefore appropriate to include recklessness or gross negligence as to
the consequences of the accused’s actions.
3. Summary of requirements for extermination. In addition to
the general requirements for a crime against humanity, the following
actus reus and mens rea must be satisfied for the crime of
extermination:
 Actus reus: The accused, by his or her acts or omissions,
contributed directly to the mass killing of others. The term
“mass killing” refers to circumstances in which a large number
of persons are killed within a certain time or space. The
contribution of the accused need not be the sole cause of the
killings. It may include, for example, the infliction of
conditions of life calculated to bring about the death of the
victims.
 Mens rea: One of the following mental elements must be
satisfied: (a) The accused intended that the mass killing take
place; or (b) the accused was reckless or grossly negligent as
to whether the mass killing took place.
C. Rape
Rape and crimes of sexual violence remain the most
controversial of the offenses covered by international criminal law. A
great deal has been written on the subject, and in the space available,
it is not possible to do justice to this corpus.155 The present section
155. See generally Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 424 (1993); Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes
Against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 243 (1994); Jennifer Green et
al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based Violence Before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist Proposal and Critique, 5
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will be limited to an examination of the jurisprudence of the
Tribunals.
In Akayesu, ICTR Trial Chamber I defined rape as a physical
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. As elaborated in the opinion,
[t]he Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that
the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a
mechanical description of objects and body parts. The Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its
definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work
of state sanctioned violence. This approach is more useful in
international law. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as
intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment,
control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation
of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
156
capacity.

This definition was approved by Trial Chamber II quater of the
Yugoslav Tribunal in the case known as Celebici.157
In its discussion of rape as a violation of the laws or customs of
war in Prosecutor v. Furundzija,158 ICTY Trial Chamber II considered
these observations, but discussed the physical act of rape in more
detail. The opinion provides a more “mechanical description” of the
crime:
It is apparent from our survey of national legislation that, in spite of
inevitable discrepancies, most legal systems in the common and
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (1994); Sharon A. Healey, Prosecuting Rape Under the Statute of
the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 327 (1995);
Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional Prosecution of Sexual Assaults, 7
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (1997); Doris E. Buss, Women at the Borders: Rape and
Nationalism in International Law, 6(2) FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 171 (1998); Kate Nahapetian,
Selective Justice: Prosecuting Rape in the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 126 (1999). See also Chesterman, supra
note 3 and sources cited therein.
156. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 597-598.
157. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 479 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998). “Thus, the Trial Chamber considers rape to constitute a physical
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances that are coercive.” Id.
In its findings, the Trial Chamber found that the act of forcing one man to perform fellatio on
another man “constituted, at least, a fundamental attack on their human dignity” and amounted
to inhuman or cruel treatment under Article 2 and 3 of the ICTY Statute. It went on to note
that this act “could constitute rape for which liability could have been found if pleaded in the
appropriate manner.” Id. ¶ 1066.
158. No. IT-95-17/1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Trial Chamber II, Dec. 10, 1998).
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civil law worlds consider rape to be the forcible sexual penetration
of the human body by the penis or the forcible insertion of any
159
other object into either the vagina or the anus.

Although the court noted that in some national jurisdictions, forcible
oral sex amounts to sexual assault rather than rape, it included forced
fellatio within the definition of rape. The Chamber held that because
the case at bar involved extremely serious offenses, charging an
accused who committed such acts with rape would not contravene the
general principle of nullum crimen sine lege.160 The ICTY Trial
Chamber II summarized the objective elements of rape:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the
perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a
161
third person.

In addition to the necessary relationship between rape and a
“widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population,”
two substantive questions are raised by the definitions adopted in the
ad hoc Tribunal jurisprudence. First is the question of lack of
consent—long a controversial topic in national jurisdictions—that is
implicit in the references to “sexual penetration . . . by coercion”162
and “under circumstances that are coercive.”163 One possible
resolution to the uncertainty inherent in these formulations would be
to modify the definition in Akayesu to include “under circumstances
that are coercive and that the accused knows or ought to know are
coercive.” Second, and related to the issue of consent, is the question
of the requisite mens rea.
As indicated earlier, the Rome Statute provides some guidance
on these questions,164 but is far from comprehensive. The elements of
rape and, in particular, crimes of sexual violence were revisited in
March 2000 and remain the subject of vigorous debate within the
PrepComs. In the absence of any compromise, it seems probable that
the provisions will be left relatively vague.

159. Id., ¶ 181.
160. See id. ¶ 184.
161. Id. ¶ 185.
162. Id.
163. Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 479 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial
Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998).
164. See supra text accompanying note 11.

CHESTERMAN.DOC

2000]

06/22/00 8:19 PM

AN ALTOGETHER DIFFERENT ORDER

341

V. CONCLUSION
In the abstract, the ongoing project to define the elements of
crimes against humanity can only progress so far. Ultimately, the
International Criminal Court itself will have to interpret its Statute on
the basis of the facts presented in the cases that come before it. The
accumulated knowledge of the two ad hoc Tribunals will be of
assistance, but their experience also suggests four discrete—and
sometimes incompatible—policy ends.
First, the minimalist view advocates that the Tribunals exist
simply to adjudicate the cases presented to them; this view does not
require the elaboration of abstract tests as presented here and, in fact,
may suggest against it. Second is the view that the Tribunals were
established to tell the story of what happened in the former
Yugoslavia since 1991 and in Rwanda in 1994. This view stems from
the ad hoc nature of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals and may
require a more expansive view of their mandates.165 Although it raises
165. The tension between these two views may be seen most clearly in the different
positions adopted on the question of concours d’infractions. Usually translated into English as
“cumulative charges,” this issue has arisen a number of times in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
Tribunals with inconsistent results. Concours d’infractions is a civil law concept with no real
parallel in common law systems. A more appropriate (if less economical) translation is
“multiple offenses in relation to the same set of facts.” An alternative translation would be
“multiple legal qualifications arising from the same set of facts.”
Part of the confusion concerns the failure to distinguish between charging, convicting, and
sentencing an accused for multiple offenses in relation to the same set of facts. It is perfectly
acceptable to charge a person with more than one offense in relation to the same set of facts.
Where one crime is a lesser included offense of the other, or in jurisdictions where multiple
convictions in relation to one transaction are not permitted, this should be done in the
alternative. If an accused is not charged in the alternative, it is nevertheless open to a tribunal
to convict that accused of one offense and not another. Whether an accused should be
convicted of two such crimes raises distinct questions. These questions are not identical with
those presented by the issue of multiple sentencing. A much quoted passage in Tadic deferred
the issue, stating that it could best be dealt with “if and when matters of penalty fall for
consideration.” Decision on the Defence Motion on the Form of the Indictment, Prosecutor v.
Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 17 (Int’l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Trial Chamber, Nov. 14, 1995). It is
unclear whether the ICTY Trial Chamber intended to hold that convictions of multiple offenses
were permissible under the ICTY Statute. Nevertheless, the decision has been interpreted to
indicate that the issue of concours d’infractions is relevant only at the sentencing stage.
A second source of confusion concerns a translation error in the Akayesu judgment. In
Akayesu, Trial Chamber I reviewed relevant international jurisprudence and the position in
Rwanda. Akayesu, No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 469. The Chamber held that it is acceptable to convict
an accused of two offenses in relation to the same set of facts in three circumstances: (1) where
the offenses have different elements; (2) where the provisions creating the offenses protect
different interests; or (3) where it is necessary to record a conviction for both offenses in order
fully to describe what the accused did. See id. The Chamber held that it is not justifiable to
convict an accused of two offenses in relation to the same set of facts: (1) where one offense is a
lesser included offense of the other, for example, murder and grievous bodily harm, robbery and
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issues of ICTY procedure that are beyond the scope of this Article, a
third position focuses on the Yugoslav Tribunal’s relationship to the
UN Security Council’s continuing efforts to restore international
peace and security to the Balkans.
The fourth perspective posits that the Tribunals should see
themselves as part of the emerging jurisprudence of international
criminal law. But this last position is undermined by the Tribunals’
own inconsistencies with customary international law. This larger
picture of juridical coherence has thus far been under-emphasized,
with the result that the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has
been piecemeal and, at times, inconsistent.
The eventual
establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court will
resolve some of these uncertainties by providing a firmer basis for a
coherent jurisprudence, but divergent policy goals are certain to arise
in the course of its work as well.
Writing on Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 war crimes trial in
Jerusalem,166 Hannah Arendt subtitled her work “A Report on the
Banality of Evil.”167 The title reflected her growing unease about the
trial as it progressed; Arendt began her initial coverage for the New
Yorker with some excitement, as “an obligation I owe my past,” but
later came to view “the whole thing [as] stinknormal, indescribably
theft, or rape and indecent assault; or (2) where one offense charges accomplice liability and the
other offense charges liability as a principal (for example, genocide and complicity in genocide).
In relation to the case at bar, the Chamber held that it was permissible to convict Akayesu of
crimes against humanity (murder), crimes against humanity (extermination) and genocide in
relation to the same set of facts. See id. The basis on which this finding was made requires some
clarification, however. The English text states that the offenses of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and violations of the laws of war “have different purposes and are, therefore, never
co-extensive.” Id. (English version only, emphasis added). This sentence does not appear in the
French version. The result is that there are two possible interpretations of the Akayesu
judgment. The first, based on the English version, is the view that charges of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and violations of the laws of war are “never co-extensive.” Id. On this view,
because they protect different interests, and will never be subsumed within a single offense, such
charges will always comply with the test in Akayesu. It would always be possible to charge and
convict an accused of more than one of these offenses, regardless of the extent of the overlap.
Under the second interpretation, relying primarily on the French version of Akayesu, it is
permissible to charge an accused with multiple offenses where those offenses have different
elements or protect different interests. Whether multiple convictions for such offenses are
appropriate will depend on whether the criteria referred to earlier are satisfied. In other words,
it will be necessary to examine, in the specific circumstances, whether the offenses as proven
have different elements and protect different interests. Broadly, this second position is that
adopted by the majority in Kayishema.
166. See Cr.C. (Jm.) 40/61 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 1961, reprinted in 56
AM. J. INT’L L. 805 (1962) (unofficial translation); Cr.A. In re Eichmann, 1962, aff’d on other
grounds, reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 5 (1968).
167. ARENDT supra note 1, at 272.
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inferior, worthless.”168 The most widely cited element of this unease
concerned the strenuous attempts of the Israeli Court to give the evils
of the Holocaust a human face in a man who remained, to Arendt,
“terribly and terrifyingly normal.”169 But at the same time Arendt was
concerned with the way the Prosecutors and the Court had
characterized the crimes in question. “Nothing is more pernicious,”
she wrote, “to an understanding of these new crimes,” and nothing
“stands more in the way of the emergence of an international penal
code,” than the “common illusion” that domestic crimes and crimes
against humanity are essentially the same: “The point of the latter is
that an altogether different order is broken and an altogether
different community is violated.”170 It remains to be seen whether the
internationalization of the criminal process discussed in this Article
will one day make it possible to view crimes against humanity as
crimes against us all.

168. See Gerry J. Simpson, War Crimes: A Critical Introduction, in THE LAW OF WAR
CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 1-2 (Timothy L.H. McCormack &
Gerry J. Simpson eds., 1997) (citing letters from Arendt in ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL,
HANNAH ARENDT: FOR THE LOVE OF THE WORLD 329-31 (1982)).
169. ARENDT, supra note 1, at 276.
170. Id. at 272 (referring to genocide, then more clearly viewed as a species of crimes against
humanity). A third concern was the failure to admit witnesses for the defense. See id. at 274.

